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ABSTRACT
We show how to decentralize constrained eﬃcient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints
between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy, these allocations can be decentralized with
private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt.
In an economy with capital, these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital
income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private
agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium
of a dynamic game between governments.
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Here we study equilibria in economies in which there is limited ability to enforce credit
arrangements between sovereign nations. In previous work (Kehoe and Perri [12]), we have discussed
how this limited ability manifests itself in enforcement constraints which require that in each period
and state, allocations can be enforced only if their value is greater than it would be if the country
were excluded from all further intertemporal and interstate trade. This friction captures in a simple
way the diﬃculties of enforcing contracts between sovereign nations that involve large transfers of
resources backed only by promises to repay. This type of friction turns out to be useful to explain
the international macroeconomic comovements.
Our recent work focuses on planning problems with enforcement constraints, or constrained
eﬃcient allocations, but does not analyze in detail how these allocations can be decentralized.
Here we do that detailed analysis. We follow the literature on sovereign debt in assuming that
the decision to partially or completely default on foreign debt is made by the government of the
borrowing country, the domestic government. We abstract completely from any incentive of private
agents to default.
The assumptions of the sovereign debt literature are motivated by historical experience.
Foreign creditors cannot easily use the domestic legal system to pursue legal claims against bor-
rowers who do not repay their loans. Therefore, international loans typically involve the domestic
government. Either the loans are made directly to the government, which then relends the funds
through a domestic intermediary, or the loans are nominally made directly to private entities, like
firms, banks, and private households, but the government guarantees the collection of debt and the
repayment to foreigners. Either way, it is the government and not a private agent that decides to
default on loans to foreigners. Of course, private agents can decide to default on their obligations
to the government just as they can default on their obligations to other domestic agents. These
private defaults are subject to the domestic legal system, and we abstract from them, as does most
of the sovereign debt literature, in order to focus the attention on the international elements. (See
the survey by Eaton and Fernandez [7] for a further discussion of the empirical motivation for these
assumptions.1)
In our economy, we model partial or complete default on foreign debt as a decision of the
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domestic government. That government has the ability to force its domestic agents to repay the
government for the foreign loans that it channeled to them, but then the government can choose
how much of these collected funds to pass on to foreigners. For simplicity, we assume that if the
government decides to partially or completely default on debt to foreigners, it redistributes the
unpaid portion of these funds to the domestic agents in a lump-sum fashion. Thus, domestic agents
always have to fully repay the government for the loan. The default decision by the government
aﬀects the problems of domestic agents by aﬀecting the interest rates at which foreigners will lend
to them.
We begin with a pure exchange economy with two countries and a large number of identical
consumers in each. We set up a planning problem with enforcement constraints and show how
the resulting constrained eﬃcient allocations can be characterized by a transition law for the ratio
of marginal utilities of consumers across countries together with a resource constraint. We show
that the constrained eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium in which
private agents take as given the default decisions of governments.
We then define a dynamic game in which the governments of the countries optimally choose
the default rates as part of the equilibria, while private agents act competitively, taking the gov-
ernment default decisions as exogenous. We show that any constrained eﬃcient allocation can be
supported as an equilibrium of this dynamic game. We do so by showing that any allocation that
satisfies the resource constraints and the enforcement constraints can be supported as an equilib-
rium in the dynamic game. The constrained eﬃcient allocation thus has the interpretation as the
best such allocation. In this sense, our economy is a standard competitive environment in which
limited international risk-sharing arises endogenously from the limited enforcement of international
contracts and the strategic interactions between governments.
Because of the enforcement constraints, borrowing is lower in our model than in an economy
with complete enforcement. In our decentralization, the force that leads to lower borrowing is high
interest rates. In particular, countries with enforcement constraints that bind in any period face
high interest rates in the preceding period. A multi-country version of our model will typically have
a variety of interest rates, with the countries with the most severe enforcement problems facing
2
the highest interest rates. We find this implication of our decentralization appealing because it
seems consistent with the data; countries with debt problems typically face high interest rates.
The implication is fundamentally diﬀerent from that of the decentralization used by Alvarez and
Jermann [2]. In their decentralization, the force that leads to lower borrowing is debt constraints.
A multi-country version of their model will have just one world interest rate, and countries with
the most severe enforcement problems will face the tightest debt constraints.
We then add capital to the model, so that the economy is a two-country standard growth
model with enforcement constraints. Here the constrained eﬃcient allocations cannot be decen-
tralized when the only instrument available to the government is the default rate on foreign loans.
This is because in the planning problem with binding enforcement constraints, the Euler equation
for capital accumulation is necessarily distorted away from the first-best.
The distortions in the Euler equation arise from two eﬀects. One is that the planner has
a diﬀerent intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption than would prevail without
the enforcement constraints. In particular, a decrease in consumption in one period that is followed
by an increase in consumption in the next ends up relaxing one more enforcement constraint than
it tightens. This leads to an extra benefit for higher investment beyond the usual one.
The other eﬀect behind the distortions in the Euler equation is that a larger amount of
capital makes the enforcement constraint tighter by raising the value of financial autarky. Together
these eﬀects introduce extra terms in the Euler equation that break the link between the intertem-
poral marginal rates of substitution and transformation. In the decentralized equilibrium, private
agents equate these marginal rates, and the constrained eﬃcient allocations cannot be decentralized
with just government default on loans. The intuition is that private agents do not internalize the
indirect eﬀects their actions have on the decisions of the government.
We then augment the government’s instruments by also allowing it to tax capital income.
With both such instruments–debt default and capital income taxes–the constrained eﬃcient
allocations can be decentralized. When the capital income tax is set appropriately, it both aligns
the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of the private agents with those of the planner
and makes private agents internalize the external eﬀect generated by investment. It is then easy
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to show that any constrained eﬃcient allocation can be supported as the equilibrium of a dynamic
game in which governments choose both default rates on foreign debt and domestic capital income
tax rates.
One implication of this decentralization is that it provides a rationale for capital income
taxes. This is in contrast to the optimal tax literature in which optimal capital income taxes are
often zero. (For a survey of this literature, see Chari and Kehoe [6].)
The main contribution of this work is to show how limited international risk-sharing can
endogenously arise in the equilibrium of an appropriately defined game with competitive private
agents. As such, this work builds on both the literature on international debt–such as the studies
of Eaton and Gersovitz [8], Kletzer and Wright [13], and Manuelli [17] and those surveyed by Eaton
and Fernandez [7]–and the literature on debt-constrained asset markets, particularly the studies
of Alvarez and Jermann [2], Attanasio and Ríos-Rull [3], Kehoe and Levine [10, 11], Kocherlakota
[14], and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall [15].
Consider first the international debt literature. In most of this literature, private competi-
tive agents in the borrowing country are not explicitly modeled; instead, a game is set up between a
large agent, often thought of as the government of the borrowing country, and some foreign lenders.
In some of this literature, it is argued that eﬃcient outcomes can be achieved only if lenders either
ration credit or impose seniority clauses. (See the survey by Eaton and Fernandez [7].)
In the debt-constrained asset market literature, private agents are explicitly modeled as
competitive, but the constraints that private consumers face are not explicitly chosen by any agent
as part of the equilibrium. For example, in the work of Kehoe and Levine [10], the enforcement
constraints are built directly into the commodity space. Alvarez and Jermann [2] go the farthest and
show how appropriately set constraints on debt can decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations
as a competitive equilibrium. Even in that work, however, the debt constraints are not chosen by
any agent. Alvarez and Jermann [2] show, rather, that if the debt constraints are appropriately
set, then the allocations of interest can be decentralized.
In some interesting work, Jeske [9] and Wright [21] also analyze competitive equilibria in
pure exchange economies with limited enforcement. Jeske compares economies in which private
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agents are allowed to borrow internationally and make default decisions with economies in which
the international borrowing and default is done solely by the government. In contrast, in our setup,
we allow private agents to borrow but the government makes the default decisions. Wright [21]
also considers constrained eﬃcient allocations in an economy with limited enforcement, but he
mainly focuses on a decentralization in which the decision to repudiate the debt is made by private
agents and not by governments. In Wright’s work, taxes on international borrowing are used by
the government to prevent private agents from borrowing too much. In our setup, anticipation of
the government’s default decisions raises the price of foreign debt to a level at which, taking as
given this price, the private agents optimally choose the correct amount.
Our work goes beyond the literatures on international debt and debt-constrained asset
markets. In contrast to the international debt literature, we explicitly model the behavior of private
agents in both countries. Interestingly, in contrast to that literature, we find that the economy
achieves the relevant eﬃcient outcome with no need for credit-rationing or seniority clauses. In
contrast to the debt-constrained asset market literature, the limited risk-sharing arises from more
primitive decisions made by agents that are explicitly modeled, namely, the governments. In
particular, the decisions to default by the government, which are the mechanism through which
international risk-sharing is limited, are derived endogenously as equilibria of a dynamic game
between governments with competitive private agents.
Moreover, in contrast to almost all of the literature, we consider an economy with capital.
(See Seppala [19] and Wright [20] for exceptions.) With capital the governments need a second
instrument in order to decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations. We show that an appro-
priately set capital income tax together with the default rates will decentralize the constrained
eﬃcient allocations.
1. CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
Consider the following deterministic pure exchange economy, which is a special case of the stochastic
pure exchange economy studied by Alvarez and Jermann [2] and the stochastic production economy
we have studied (Kehoe and Perri [12]). We will show here that constrained eﬃcient allocations in
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this economy can be decentralized when private agents take as given some exogenously set default
decisions by governments.
1.1. The World Economy
Our theoretical world economy consists of two countries, i = 1, 2, each represented by a large
number of identical, infinitely lived consumers and a time-varying deterministic endowment of a
single homogeneous consumption good. The endowment of country i in time period t is yit while
consumers in country i have utility, or preferences, of the form
P∞
t=0 β
tU(cit), where cit denotes
consumption of the endowment good by consumers in country i in t and β denotes the discount
factor. The resource constraints are given by
c1t + c2t = y1t + y2t. (1)
We assume that for country i = 1, 2, all endowments yit ∈ [y, y¯] for some finite, strictly positive
constants y and y¯ .
The presence of limited enforcement of international contracts implies that in each period
each country has the option of reneging on any outstanding obligations and living in autarky
forever after. This possibility imposes on any equilibrium allocation a set of enforcement constraints
which require that at every point in time, each country prefers the equilibrium allocation over the








where Vit denotes the value of autarky for country i from period t on, which is given by the value
of utility in which consumers simply consume their endowment from t on.
The constrained eﬃcient allocations of this economy solve the planning problem of maxi-













subject to the resource constraints (1) and the enforcement constraints (2) for country i = 1, 2 and
all periods t, where λ1 and λ2 are positive initial weights on the two countries’ utilities.
An allocation {c1t, c2t}∞t=0 is constrained eﬃcient if it solves the planning problem for some
nonnegative planning weights λ1 and λ2.We characterize these allocations as follows. Let βtµit and
γt denote the multipliers on the enforcement constraints and the resource constraints, respectively.
The first-order conditions are, then,
βtU 0(cit)[λi + µi0 + µi1 + . . .+ µit] = γt. (4)
From (4), we see that an increase in consumption cit in period t has two eﬀects. It has the
standard eﬀect of raising the objective function by βtU 0(cit)λi. It also relaxes all of the incentive
constraints from period 0 through period t. This eﬀect has value βtU 0(cit)(µi0 + . . . + µit). Using
(4), we see that the planner’s eﬀective intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between goods












where Mit = λi0 + µi0 + . . . + µit. The first term on the right side of (5) is the standard one that
arises from changing the value of the objective function by moving one unit of consumption from
period t to period t + 1. The second term captures the following eﬀect on incentives. Decreasing
consumption in period t tightens the incentive constraints from period 0 to period t, while increasing
consumption in period t+1 relaxes these constraints from period 0 to period t+1. The net eﬀect on
the incentive constraints by such a change is to relax the constraint in period t+1. The second term
on the right side of (5) is nonnegative, and thus, the planner has a higher intertemporal marginal

















It should be clear that in a given period t+1, both incentive constraints cannot bind. Thus, there are
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three binding patterns: µ1t+1 > 0 and µ2t+1 = 0 or µ1t+1 = 0 and µ2t+1 > 0 or µ1t+1 = µ2t+1 = 0.
For example, if µ1t+1 > 0 and µ2t+1 = 0, then (6) implies that shifting consumption in period t+1
from consumer 2 to consumer 1 has the additional benefit of relaxing the incentive constraint for
consumer 1 in period t+ 1 over and above the standard eﬀects on marginal utility.
It is convenient to have notation for the consumer with the higher intertemporal marginal









In our decentralization, qt,t+1 and pt,t+1 correspond to the marginal rate of substitution for the
lender and the borrower, respectively. We then have a version of a lemma established by Alvarez
and Jermann [2]:
Lemma. Let {c1t, c2t} be a constrained eﬃcient allocation. If the enforcement constraint








Proof. If the enforcement constraint for consumer 1 is slack at t+1, then µ1t+1 = 0. Eq. (6)
and the fact that µ2t+1 ≥ 0 and M2t > 0 imply that the marginal rate of substitution of consumer
1 is higher than that of consumer 2, so (9) holds. If the enforcement constraint for consumer 1
binds at t + 1, then µ1t+1 > 0 and µ2t+1 = 0. Eq. (6) plus the fact that M1t > 0 imply that the
marginal rate of substitution of consumer 1 is lower than that of consumer 2, and (10) holds. ¥
We will be most interested in allocations for which the present value of the allocation,
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at the appropriately defined intertemporal prices, is finite for each consumer. Letting q0,t =
q0,1q1,2 . . . qt−1,t, we say that an allocation {c1t, c2t}∞t=0 has high implied interest rates if for i = 1, 2,
∞X
t=0
q0,t(y1t + y2t) <∞. (11)
Here qt,t+1 is the marginal rate of substitution for whichever country’s representative consumer
is unconstrained in period t + 1. Typically, in some periods, one country’s consumer will be un-
constrained while in other periods, the other country’s consumer will be unconstrained. Thus,
the product of these marginal rates q0,t does not represent any single consumer’s marginal rate of
substitution between periods 0 and t, but rather is a mixture of both representative consumers’
marginal rates. The high implied interest rate condition guarantees that in the decentralized equi-
librium the present value of endowments is finite. We use it to show that constructed assets is finite
and that the consumer’s transversality condition holds.
1.2. Decentralization With Government Default
Now we discuss how to decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations as a competitive equilibrium
with government default decisions taken as given. We show that if these default decisions are
appropriately chosen, then the constrained eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized. (In the next
section, we will allow the governments to purposefully choose these default decisions.)
In this economy, the government of each country collects any repayments its consumers
make on foreign loans and then decides how much of these repayments to pass on to foreigners.
The idea is that all loans from foreigners to domestic consumers are channeled through the domestic
government. For simplicity, we assume that the government rebates in a lump-sum fashion any net
revenues it takes in. Except for these government policies, private markets function perfectly.
We begin by setting up a competitive equilibrium with government default. Consider the
consumer problem and the government budget constraint for some arbitrarily given sequence of
government policies and prices. Throughout we will focus on country 1; the notation for country
2 is analogous. It is convenient to define separate variables for saving and for borrowing. We
let s1t+1 ≥ 0 denote the savings, or assets, of a consumer in country 1, b1t+1 ≥ 0 denote that
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consumer’s borrowings, or liabilities, and τ1t ∈ [0, 1] denote the default rate by the government of
country 1 on foreign lenders, which here are country 2 consumers.




subject to the budget constraint
c1t + Pt,t+1(s1t+1 − b1t+1) = y1t + (1− τ2t)s1t − b1t + T1t; (12)
the nonnegativity constraints sit+1, bit+1 ≥ 0; and bounds on debt b1t+1 ≤ b¯, where b¯ is a large
positive constant. Here Pt,t+1 is the price of a consumption good in t+ 1 in period t units, τ2t is
the default rate chosen by country 2’s government on payments s1t that country 2 consumers make
to country 1 consumers, and T1t is the lump-sum rebates by the government of country 1 to its
consumers. The initial assets si0 and liabilities bi0 are given.
The government budget constraint in country 1 is T1t = τ1tb1t, so that any revenues taken
in by the government through partial or complete default is rebated to consumers.
A competitive equilibrium with default rates {τ1t, τ2t}∞t=0 together with initial assets and
liabilities {si0, bi0}i=1,2 consists of an allocation {c1t, c2t}∞t=0, assets {s1t+1, s2t+1}∞t=0, liabilities
{b1t+1, b2t+1}∞t=0, and prices {Pt,t+1}∞t=0 such that {cit, sit+1, bit+1} solves the consumer problem
for each i, and markets clear, so that s1t+1 = b2t+1 and b1t+1 = s2t+1 and the resource constraints
(1) hold.
To understand the budget constraints of the consumer and the government, suppose that in
period t− 1, a consumer in country 1 lends Pt−1,ts1t in exchange for a promise to receive, in period
t, the amount s1t minus the portion withheld by the government, namely, τ2ts1t. Consumers in
country 2 repay the full amount owed, s1t = b2t, but the government of country 2 repays to country
1 consumers only part of that, (1−τ2t)s1t, and redistributes the rest to its consumers in a lump-sum
fashion.
For brevity, from now on we let U 0it denote U
0(cit). With this notation, the first-order
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conditions for consumer 1’s problem are
Pt,t+1U 01t ≥ βU 01t+1(1− τ2t+1) (13)
with equality if s1t+1 > 0, so that country 1 is lending to country 2; and
Pt,t+1U
0
1t ≤ βU 01t+1 (14)
with equality if b1t+1 > 0, so that country 2 is lending to country 1. Here and throughout we
assume that the debt constraint b1t+1 ≤ b¯ does not bind. The transversality condition is
lim
t→∞
βtPt,t+1U 01t(s1t+1 − b1t+1) = 0. (15)
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Any allocation that satisfies the resource constraints (1) and the enforcement
constraints (2) and has high implied interest rates (11) can be decentralized as a competitive
equilibrium with government default for some appropriate choice of initial assets.
Proof. We decentralize the given allocation as follows. We first set the intertemporal prices
Pt,t+1 = pt,t+1 = mini[βU 0(cit+1)/U 0(cit)]. These prices will correspond to the borrower’s marginal





















for t ≥ 0 and τ10 = 0, τ20 = 0. Note that if U 01t+1/U 01t > U 02t+1/U 02t, then country 1 is lending to
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country 2. The constructed default rates lie between 0 and 1 and satisfy




For assets and liabilities, we set





qt+1,s(c1s − y1s) (19)
for t ≥ 0, and for initial assets, we set
s10 − b10 =
∞X
s=0
q0,s(c1s − y1s) (20)
where we know that the right sides of (19) and (20) are finite because of the high interest rate
condition (11). Here qt,t+1 corresponds to the marginal rate of substitution for the lenders. If
the right side of (19) is nonnegative, we set b1t+1 = 0; if the right side of (19) is negative, we set
s1t+1 = 0. We set s10 and b10 analogously from (20). Eq. (19) defines the assets and liabilities
chosen by consumers in equilibrium while (20) defines the initial assets and liabilities that are
exogenously given to consumers.
We can see that the constructed prices, default rates, and assets and liabilities are a com-
petitive equilibrium as follows. To check the constructed prices, notice that in equilibrium in any
period t, there are three possibilities. One is that U 01t+1/U 01t > U 02t+1/U 02t. Here country 1 is lending








Another possibility is that U 01t+1/U 01t < U 02t+1/U 02t. Here country 2 is lending to country 1, so that

















From (21)—(23), it is clear that the price pt,t+1 satisfies (8), which, recall, is the marginal rate
of substitution for the borrower. To check the constructed default rates, note the following. If
(21) holds, then U 01t+1/U 01t = qt,t+1; if (22) holds, then U 02t+1/U 02t = qt,t+1; if (23) holds, then
pt,t+1 = qt,t+1. Clearly, then, the constructed default rates (16) and (17) satisfy (21)—(23).
To check that the constructed assets and liabilities are budget feasible, consider an arbitrary
period t and substitute (19) and the budget constraint of the government T1t = τ1tb1t into the




qt+1,s(c1s − y1s) = y1t − c1t + (1− τ2t)s1t − b1t(1− τ1t). (24)
Again, there are three possibilities. One is that U 01t/U 01t−1 > U 02t/U 02t−1. In period t − 1,
country 1 is lending to country 2, s1t > 0, and b1t = 0. In this case, 1 − τ2t = pt−1,t/qt−1,t.
Substituting into (24) and rearranging, we get





qt,s(cis − yis) (25)
which is the same as (19), shifted back one period. In the other two possibilities (U 01t/U 01t−1 <
U 02t/U 02t−1 and U 01t/U 01t−1 = U 02t/U 02t−1), the same logic applies, and we obtain the same expression
as in (25) for assets in period t. Since this logic applies for every period, we have shown that the
definition of assets is consistent with the given allocation and with the budget constraint of the
consumer.
The final step in the proof of Proposition 1 is to show that at the constructed allocations,
if the high implied interest rate condition (11) holds, then the transversality condition (15) holds.
We need only show that limt→∞ βtpt,t+1U 01t(b1t+1 − s1t+1) = 0. Now, using (19) and the relation
13









qt,s(y1s − c1s). (26)
Using the result that βtU 01t/U 010 ≤ q0,t, so that βtU 01tqt,s = U 010(βtU 01t/U 010)qt,s ≤ U 010q0,tqt,s = U 010q0,s,




q0,s(y1s − c1s) ≤ U 010 limt→∞
∞X
s=t+1
q0,s(y1s + y2s) = 0 (27)
where the equality in (27) follows from (11). ¥
The basic idea of the construction is as follows. From the consumer budget constraint (12),
it is clear that the price Pt,t+1 has the following interpretation. For a borrower, it is the amount
a borrower receives in period t for a payment of one unit in t + 1. For a lender, it is the amount
the lender gives in t for a payment of one unit in t + 1 minus whatever the percentage amount
that the government of the borrowing country decides to default. Clearly, in the decentralized
equilibrium, this price will be equal to the borrower’s marginal rate of substitution. From (21) and
(22), it is clear that the marginal rate of substitution of the borrower equals that of the lender
once this lender’s rate has been reduced by the default rate. Hence, we can use the ratio of these
marginal rates to construct the implicit default rates. Finally, when calculating the relevant present
discounted values for assets and liabilities in (19), the relevant price is the borrower’s marginal rate
of substitution.
2. ENDOGENIZING THE DEFAULT DECISIONS
In our decentralization, we have used allocations that satisfy enforcement constraints, resource
constraints, and the high interest rate condition to construct the appropriate default rates that
decentralize the given allocations, but we have not oﬀered a story about where these default rates
come from. Here we provide a story for how the constructed default rates may come out of an
equilibrium of a dynamic game with both government behavior and consumer behavior endogenous.
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2.1. The Dynamic Game
We set up this dynamic game as follows. In each period, the governments and the consumers can
vary their decisions, depending on the history of government policies up to the time the decision is
made. We let πt = (τ1t, τ2t) denote the two governments’ policies in period t. At the beginning of
period t, the government of each country chooses a current policy as a function of the history of past
government policies ht−1 = (π0, ..., πt−1) together with a contingency plan for setting future policies
for all possible future histories. Let τ it(ht−1) denote the period t default rate (so that 1− τ it(ht−1)
is the repayment rate) chosen by the government of country i when faced with history ht−1. After
the government sets the current policies, consumers make their decisions. Faced with the history
ht = (ht−1, πt), consumers in country i choose their period t consumption, assets, and liabilities,
denoted fit(ht) = (cit(ht), sit+1(hit), bit+1(ht)). The prices are a function of the government policy
history and are denoted pt,t+1(ht). Let τ = (τ1, τ2), and let τ i denote the infinite sequence of
functions (τ it). Use similar notation for the other variables.
For some given initial assets and liabilities, a sustainable equilibrium is a triple (τ, f, p) such
that three conditions are satisfied:
(i) For i = 1, 2, for every history of government policies ht, the consumer allocations fis(hs)






c1s + ps,s+1(hs)(s1s+1 − b1s+1)
= y1s + [1− τ2s(hs−1)]s1s(hs−1)− b1s(hs−1) + T1s(hs−1)
where the future histories’ policies and prices are induced from ht, τ , and p in the obvious way.
That is, ht+1 = (ht, τ t+1(ht)) and ht+2 = (ht,τ t+1(ht),τ t+2(ht, τ t+1(ht))), and given these induced
future histories, the policies and prices are given by τs(hs−1) and ps(hs).
(ii) For every history ht, markets clear and the government budget constraint holds for
s = t, ..., so that c1s(hs)+c2s(hs) = y1s+y2s as well as s1s+1(hs) = b2s+1(hs), s2s+1(hs) = b1s+1(hs),
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and T1s(hs−1) ≡ τ1s(hs−1)b1s(hs−1), where the future histories hs are induced from τ in the obvious
way.


















2t+1(ht))) and so on. A similar
condition holds for the government of country 2.
Notice that in this definition of a sustainable equilibrium, we require that both the govern-
ments and the consumers act optimally for every history of policies–even for histories not induced
by the governments’ policy plans. This requirement is analogous to the requirement of perfection
in a game. In this definition, the consumers act competitively in that they take current policies
and prices and the evolution of future histories as unaﬀected by their actions. The governments
are not competitive. The government of country 1, for example, takes the allocation rules f1 and
f2, the price function p, and the policy plan of the government of country 2, τ 2, as given. But the
government of country 1 realizes that it can aﬀect outcomes both directly, by changing the default
rate on its foreign loans, and indirectly, by aﬀecting the evolution of the future history and thus
aﬀecting the policies chosen by the other government, the allocations chosen by the consumers, and
the prices.
2.2. Outcomes of a Sustainable Equilibrium
Recall that a sustainable equilibrium (τ , f, p) is a sequence of functions that specify policies, allo-
cations, and prices for all possible government policy histories. Thus, when we start from the null
history in period 0, a sustainable equilibrium induces a particular sequence of policies, allocations,
and prices that we denote by (π, x, p). We call this the outcome induced by the sustainable equi-
librium. In what follows, we adapt the work of Chari and Kehoe [4, 5], which builds on the work
of Abreu [1], to characterize this outcome.
We first construct a sustainable equilibrium that we call the autarky equilibrium. We
then characterize the allocations that can be induced by reverting to this autarky equilibrium
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after deviations. We define the autarky policy plans τa, allocation rules fa, and price rules pa
starting from some given initial assets and liabilities as follows. The policy plan specifies com-





it+1(ht)) are given by c
a
it(ht) = yit, while the autarky prices of debt and the




it+1(ht) = 0. The
utility of autarky for consumer i in period t is Vit.
We now characterize the outcomes that can be sustained by a set of plans called the revert-
to-autarky plans, which are defined as follows. For an arbitrary sequence of policies, allocations, and
prices (π, x, p), these plans specify continuation with the candidate sequences (π, x, p) as long as the
specified policies have been chosen in the past; otherwise, the plans specify the revert-to-autarky
plans (τa, fa, pa). We then have
Proposition 2. An arbitrary triple of sequences (π, x, p) that satisfies the high implied
interest rate condition (11) can be sustained by the revert-to-autarky plans if and only if the triple
is a competitive equilibrium with government default for some choice of initial assets and if, for
i = 1, 2 for every t, the following inequality holds:
∞X
s=t
βs−tU(cis) ≥ Vit. (28)
Proof. Suppose, first, that the sequences of policies, allocations, and prices (π, x, p) can be
sustained by the revert-to-autarky plans; that is, suppose the associated revert-to-autarky plans
(τ, f, p) constitute a sustainable equilibrium. From the definition of a sustainable equilibrium,
consumer optimality requires that x maximize consumer welfare in period 0. This requirement
together with market-clearing ensures that this sequence is a competitive equilibrium in period 0.
Next, we claim that inequality (28) holds for all i and t. Note that a feasible policy for
the government of i in t is to choose the autarky policies for all s ≥ t by taxing repayments to
consumers in the other country at rate 1. This policy will lead to a continuation utility of V ait , and
hence, optimality of government policy ensures that (28) holds.
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Now suppose that some arbitrary triple of sequences (π, x, p) satisfies the proposition’s con-
ditions. We show that the associated revert-to-autarky plans constitute a sustainable equilibrium.
Consider, first, histories for which there have been no deviations from π before t. Since (π, x, p) is
a competitive equilibrium in period 0, x is optimal for consumers in period 0 given π and p, and
thus, the continuation of x is optimal for consumers when they are faced with the continuation of
π and p. In terms of government optimality, consider the situation of the government of country
1. If it deviates in period t, then the consumers in both countries and the government of country
2 will revert to the autarky policy plans and the autarky allocation rules from period t on. Under
these allocation rules, country 2 consumers will never lend to country 1 consumers, regardless of
the policies chosen by the government of country 1. Thus, the best the government of country 1
can obtain is the value of autarky from then on given by the right side of (28). Given the assumed
inequality, then, sticking to the specified plan is optimal.
Consider, next, histories with a deviation from π before t. Clearly, the autarky plans from
then on are sustainable. From a consumer’s point of view, since no debt will be repaid, lending is
not optimal. The price of debt is zero since the value to a potential lender in the other country of a
promise to pay one unit tomorrow, net of taxes equal to one unit, is worthless. Thus, the consumer
is indiﬀerent among all amounts to borrow or lend because all have value 0 and all pay 0. From a
government’s point of view, given that the other government never allows its consumers to repay
their debts outside the country, regardless of the first government’s actions, it is optimal for the
first government to prevent its own consumers from repaying their debts outside the country. ¥
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we immediately obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Any allocation that satisfies the resource constraint and the enforcement
constraints and has high implied interest rates is the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium for some
choice of initial assets.
The immediate corollary to this proposition is the following.
Corollary. The constrained eﬃcient allocations are the best sustainable equilibrium out-
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comes in the sense that they maximize (3) over the set of sustainable equilibrium outcomes.
So far we have presumed that the welfare weights in (3) are given and that in the decen-
tralization we can set the initial assets. In some interpretations, we might take the initial assets
as given and then figure out for what set of welfare weights the corollary holds. To do so, we can
use a variant of the Negishi [18] and Mantel [16] algorithm that finds these relative weights in a
fixed-point problem.
3. ADDING CAPITAL
We now explore how our results change when we move from a pure exchange economy to a growth
model with capital. We first show in a constrained eﬃcient allocation that if the enforcement con-
straints bind, then the Euler equation for capital is distorted. This result implies that a competitive
equilibrium with government default alone cannot decentralize such an allocation. But if we give
the government an extra instrument, a capital income tax, then the constrained eﬃcient allocations
can be decentralized.
3.1. A Growth Model
We modify our pure exchange economy in several ways. The preferences are the same as before.
The resource constraints are now
c1t + c2t + k1t+1 + k2t+1 = A1tf(k1t) +A2tf(k2t) + (1− δ)(k1t + k2t) (29)
with ki0 given, where kit+1 is the capital stock chosen in period t for use in production in country i
in period t+1; f(k) is a standard production function that is increasing, concave, and continuously
diﬀerentiable and satisfies the standard Inada conditions; Ait is country-specific, deterministically
fluctuating productivity; and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The role of the fluctuating
productivities is to generate a desire to borrow and lend. The enforcement constraints are now
∞X
s=t








cit + kit+1 = Aitf(kit) + (1− δ)kit. (32)
Notice that the problem with (financial) autarky reduces to that of a planning problem of a closed-
economy growth model. Notice also that the value of utility under autarky in period t depends on
the amount of capital located in country i in that period, kit. The derivative of this value, V 0(kit),
will be part of the root problem behind why the equilibrium with debt constraints alone cannot
decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations.
The constrained eﬃcient allocations of this economy solve the planning problem of maxi-












subject to the resource constraints (29) and the enforcement constraints (30) for country i = 1, 2
and all periods t, where λ1 and λ2 are nonnegative initial weights on the two countries’ utilities.
An allocation {c1t, c2t, k1t+1, k2t+1}∞t=0 is constrained eﬃcient if it solves the planning prob-
lem for some nonnegative weights λ1 and λ2. Let βtµit denote the multiplier on the enforcement
constraints, and let γt denote the multiplier on the resource constraints. The first-order condition
for consumption cit is
βtU 0(cit)[λi + µi0 + . . .+ µit] = γt (34)




0(kit+1) + 1− δ]. (35)
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The transversality condition for capital accumulation is
lim
t→∞
γtkit+1 = 0. (36)
We can substitute (34) into (35) to get
U 0(cit) = βU 0(cit+1)[Ait+1f 0(kit+1) + 1− δ] +
βµit+1
Mit
(U 0(cit+1)[Ait+1f 0(kit+1) + 1− δ]− V 0(kit+1))
where Mit = λi0 + µi0 + . . . + µit. From (34), we see that here, as in the pure exchange economy,
an increase in consumption cit in period t has two eﬀects. One is the standard eﬀect of raising
the objective function by λiβtU 0(cit). The other is relaxing all of the incentive constraints from
period 0 through period t. This eﬀect has value βtU 0(cit)(µi0 + . . . + µit). Using (34), we see that
the planner’s eﬀective intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between goods in period t and












The first term on the right side of (37) is the standard one that arises from changing the value
of the objective function by moving one unit of consumption from period t to period t + 1. The
second term on the right captures the eﬀect on incentives described in section 1, which makes the
planner have a higher intertemporal marginal rate of substitution than the standard one. By itself,
this eﬀect raises the benefit to having a higher capital stock at t + 1 and pushes up the resulting
investment.
From (35), we see that an increase in the capital stock in period t has, in addition to the
standard eﬀect of shifting resources from period t to period t+ 1, an eﬀect on incentives captured
by µit+1V
0
it+1(kit+1). This term reflects the fact that by increasing the capital stock in t + 1, the
value of autarky Vit+1(kit+1) is increased, and this tightens the incentive constraint on the margin
by V 0it+1(kit+1). This incentive eﬀect, by itself, lowers the benefit to having a higher capital stock
in t+ 1 and dampens the resulting investment.
To see how these various forces aﬀect the Euler equation for capital, we can substitute (34)
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into (35) to get




(U 0(cit+1)[Ait+1f 0(kit+1) + 1− δ]− V 0it+1(kit+1)).
If the incentive constraint for consumer i in period t+ 1 were slack (so that µit+1 = 0), then (38)
would reduce to the familiar undistorted Euler equation for a growth model. The right side of (38)
captures the two eﬀects just discussed on this Euler equation.
Here, as in the pure exchange economy, we restrict ourselves to constrained eﬃcient alloca-




q0,t (A1tf(k1t) +A2tf(k2t) + (1− δ)(k1t + k2t)) <∞ (39)
where q0,t = q0,1q1,2 . . . qt−1,t and where qt,t+1 is defined in (7). This condition guarantees that in
the decentralized equilibrium the present value of gross output is finite. We use it to guarantee
that in our decentralization the constructed assets are finite and the transversality condition for
bonds holds.
3.2. Decentralization With Government Default and Capital Income Taxes
Consider now decentralizing the constrained eﬃcient outcome as a competitive equilibrium with
taxes on capital income as well as government default on debt. With these two instruments,
the government can mimic the distorted first-order conditions that define the constrained eﬃcient
outcome. The role of government default is the same here as in the pure exchange economy. The
role of capital income taxes is to make the consumers internalize the two intertemporal eﬀects on
incentives that shifting consumption over time has.
The problem for a representative consumer in country 1 who faces both government debt
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subject to the budget constraint
c1t + Pt,t+1(s1t+1 − b1t+1) + k1t+1 = w1t + (1− τ2t)s1t − b1t +R1tk1t + T1t (40)
and the nonnegativity constraints s1t+1, b1t+1 ≥ 0, with s10, b10, and k10 given. Here w1t is the wage
rate and Rit = 1+ (1− θit)(rit − δ) is the return on capital after taxes and depreciation, where rit
is the before-tax return on capital and θit is the tax on capital income net of depreciation (rit− δ).
In this decentralization, there are firms which behave in a way we can summarize by conditions for
rental rates and wage rates:
rit = Aitf 0(kit) and wit = Aitf(kit)− kitAitf 0(kit). (41)
The government budget constraint in country 1 is
T1t = τ1tb1t + θ1t(r1t − δ).
In this economy, a competitive equilibrium with government debt default rates and cap-
ital income taxes {τ1t, τ2t, θ1t, θ2t}∞t=0 together with initial assets, liabilities, and capital stocks
{si0, bi0, ki0}i=1,2 consists of allocations {c1t, c2t, k1t+1, k2t+1}∞t=0, assets {s1t+1, s2t+1}∞t=0, liabilities
{b1t+1, b2t+1}∞t=0, and prices {Pt,t+1, rit, wit}∞t=0 such that {cit, sit+1, bit+1, kit+1} solves the consumer
problem for each i and markets clear, so that s1t+1 = b2t+1 and b1t+1 = s2t+1 and the resource
constraints (29) hold.
In this equilibrium, the first-order conditions for a consumer in country 1 are expressions
(13)—(15) together with the Euler equation for capital
U 0(cit) = βU 0(cit+1)(1 + (1− θit+1)[Ait+1f 0(kit+1)− δ]) (42)
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and the consumer’s transversality condition for capital, namely,
lim
t→∞
βtU 0(cit)kit+1 = 0. (43)
Proposition 4. Any allocation that satisfies the resource constraint and has high implied
interest rates can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with government default and capital
income taxes.
Proof. In our decentralization, we assume that the initial capital stock in each country, k10
and k20, is owned by consumers in that country. In the competitive equilibrium, the initial physical
capital stocks are given. The construction of the default rates, assets, liabilities, and prices is nearly
identical to that for the pure exchange economy. As before, intertemporal prices Pt,t+1 are set by
(8), and government default rates are set according to (16) and (17). We set rental rates and wage
rates according to (41).
For assets and liabilities, we set





qt+1,s(cis −wis + kis+1 −Riskis) (44)
for t ≥ 0, and for initial assets, we set
si0 − bi0 =
∞X
s=0
q0,s(cis −wis + kis+1 −Riskis) (45)
where we have set Ri0 = 1. Notice that the high interest rate condition (equation (39)) implies that
the right side of (44) and the right side of (45) are finite. If the right side of (44) is nonnegative, we
set bit+1 = 0; if the right side of (44) is negative, we set sit+1 = 0. We set si0 and bi0 analogously
from (45). Equation (44) defines the assets and liabilities chosen by consumers in equilibrium while
(45) defines the initial assets and liabilities that are exogenously given to consumers.
For t > 0, the tax on capital income θit is backed out from the Euler equation
U 0(cit) = βU 0(cit+1)[1 + (1− θit+1)(Ait+1f 0(kit+1)− δ)]
24
so that Rit+1 = [1 + (1− θit+1)(Ait+1f 0(kit+1)− δ)] is set equal to U 0(cit)/βU 0(cit+1). For t = 0 we
set Ri0 = 1.
To check that the constructed assets and liabilities are budget feasible and that the transver-
sality conditions for the individual are satisfied, we substitute the budget constraint of the govern-
ment into that of the consumer and use the same logic as in Proposition 1.
Finally, consider the transversality conditions. It is easy to adapt our earlier arguments




βtU 0(cit)[λi + µi0 + . . .+ µit]kit+1 = 0 (46)
clearly implies the consumer’s transversality condition for capital, namely,
lim
t→∞
βtU 0(cit)kit+1 = 0 (47)
since the sum of the multipliers µi0 + . . .+ µit is nonnegative. ¥
3.3. Endogenizing the Default and Capital Income Tax Decisions
Here we briefly discuss how to endogenize the decisions of the governments in a dynamic game.
It is immediate to extend the revert-to-autarky plans considered in the pure exchange econ-
omy to the economy with capital. To do so, we let πt = (π1t, π2t), where πit = (τ it, θit), and we let
xt = (x1t, x2t), with xit = (cit, sit+1, bit+1, kit+1). It is straightforward to prove the analog of part
of Proposition 2.
Proposition 5. In the economy with capital, an arbitrary triple of sequences (π, x, p) can be
sustained by the revert-to-autarky plans if the triple is a competitive equilibrium with government




βs−tU(cis) ≥ Vit(kit+1). (48)
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It is then immediate to interpret the constrained eﬃcient outcomes as the outcomes of a
sustainable equilibrium with some suitably chosen initial assets. It remains an open question as to
whether there can be equilibria with lower values than that of autarky. In particular, there may be
equilibria in which consumers’ expectations of future capital income taxes respond to the current
government policies in a complicated way that is self-sustaining.
4. ADDING UNCERTAINTY
Throughout this work so far, we have focused on a deterministic economy in order to economize
on notation, but all our results immediately generalize to a stochastic economy where the produc-
tivity Ait is a random variable. Constrained eﬃcient allocations in this economy are characterized
in Kehoe and Perri [12]. Note that in an economy without uncertainty the presence of limited
enforcement limits the extent of intertemporal consumption smoothing while in an economy with
uncertainty it limits the extent of both intertemporal smoothing and international risk-sharing.
In each period t, the world economy experiences one of finitely many events st. We denote
by st = (s0, . . . , st) the history of events up through and including period t. The probability, as of
period 0, of any particular history st is π(st). The initial realization s0 is given, so that π(s0) = 1.
In each period t, the single good is produced in country i using inputs of capital ki(st−1) and
domestic labor li(st). Production is also subject to a country-specific random shock Ai(st), which
follows an exogenous process. Output in country i at st is given by F (ki(st−1), Ai(st)li(st)), where







where ci(st) denotes consumption by consumers in country i at st and β denotes the discount factor.














where δ is the per period depreciation rate of capital.





βr−tπ(sr|st)U(ci(sr), li(sr)) ≥ Vi(ki(st−1), st) (51)
where π(sr|st) denotes the conditional probability of sr given st, π(st|st) = 1, and
Vi(ki(st−1), st) denotes the value of autarky from st onward, which is given by the value of utility
in the problem of choosing ki(sr), li(sr), and ci(sr) for all sr with r ≥ t to solve







ci(sr) + ki(sr) ≤ F (ki(sr−1), Ai(sr)li(sr)) + (1− δ)ki(sr−1)
with ki(st−1) given.
The analysis is nearly identical to that in the deterministic economy. The only interesting
point is that there are a number of degrees of freedom in assigning the state-contingent capital
income taxes that decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations. To see this, note that in the




π(st+1|st)Uic(st+1)[1 + (1− θi(st+1))(Ai(st+1)Fik(st+1)− δ)] (52)
where Uic(st) is the marginal utility of consumption of a consumer in country i in state st. Let








then θˆi(st, st+1) also decentralizes this allocation. One way to uniquely assign such taxes is to
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suppose that they do not vary with the current state, so that θi(st, st+1) = θ¯(st).
5. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a decentralization of constrained eﬃcient allocations in which the forces that
produce the limited risk-sharing are more explicitly modeled than in the existing literature. The
decentralization is intuitively appealing when applied to international risk-sharing problems for
economies with capital and a limited ability to enforce contracts. It may be possible to similarly
model the forces that limit risk-sharing in other decentralizations, for example, an equilibrium in
which the debt constraints studied by Alvarez and Jermann [2] are explicitly chosen by financial
intermediaries in an appropriately defined dynamic game.
Here we have focused on a deterministic economy in order to economize on notation, but all
our results immediately generalize to a stochastic economy, provided that default rates and capital
income taxes can be state-contingent.
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Notes
1Much of the work on sovereign debt is motivated by the debt crises of the 1970s and the
1980s. In discussing these crises Eaton and Fernandez ([7], p. 2059) argue the following: “Most of
the debt that developing countries ran up during the 1970s and 1980s was incurred or guaranteed
by the governments of these countries. One reason for the prominent role of the government might
have been creditors’ suspicions about the local judicial system’s ability or willingness to enforce a
loan contract with a private debtor. Even in cases where debt was initially nonguaranteed, private
creditors turned to the government to make good on loans that went sour.”
Eaton and Fernandez ([7], p. 2059) discuss cases in which even when debts seemed to be
completely private, foreign creditors held the government accountable for assuming the obligations
of its citizens whenever these citizens did not pay. The events of the Argentine debt crisis in No-
vember of 2001 seem to confirm that this pattern continues to the present. Through the imposition
of capital controls and banking restrictions the Argentinian government has de facto forced private
debtors to (partially) default on their foreign, dollar-denominated, debt.
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